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INTRODUCTION
Between 9 June and 9 July 2006, the FIFA World Cup 2006 (hereafter
World Cup) dramatically changed public life in most German cities. In the
media, the temporary reign of football over Germany’s city centres has been
most powerfully visualised through spectacular images of tens of thousands
of mostly peaceful football fans on so-called ‘public viewing sites’ or ‘fan
miles’, which was later named Germany’s Word of the Year 2006.
Despite its concern with the football World Cup, however, this chapter is
not about sport. Rather, this study focuses on another spectacular aspect of
the World Cup, which can be exempliﬁed by a simple number: 5.3 kilometres.
In Berlin alone, fences 5.3 kilometres long and 2.2 metres high were erected,
allowing the demarcation of an impressively large ‘fan zone’ in the city centre,
reaching from the Brandenburger Tor to the Strasse des 17 Juni. Closely moni-
tored by CCTV cameras, thousands of private security agents and police
forces, this pre-deﬁned fan zone – as the territorial framework for the concen-
tration of fans on speciﬁc, and clearly separated, parts of the city centre –
both materially and symbolically allowed the regulation of social life during
the World Cup.
As a symptomatic illustration of the spatially bound logics of security and
surveillance strategies, the picture of Berlin’s fan mile also provides a power-
ful entry point to the main aim of this chapter, which is to examine the
territorial articulations of security/surveillance measures for the World Cup
2006. In this, the basic line of my argument is that security politics in general
not only tends to relate to speciﬁc persons or social groups (Marx 1988; Lyon
2003) but also to select, classify, divide, mark, arrange, in one word, to diﬀer-
entiate speciﬁc categories of space. The functions of security and surveillance
operations, their scope, impact and the risks they pose cannot be understood
without referring to the territories concerned and created by their spatial
deployment and performance.
Described as a cross-disciplinary, rapidly developing ﬁeld of analysis and
theory (Lyon 2002: 1), Surveillance Studies have sparked remarkable and
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revealing research over the last few years. Focusing on the increased possi-
bilities of knowing, tracking, data-mining and proﬁling everyday life, one of
the innovative powers of Surveillance Studies is to consider surveillance not
only in relation to security issues but as a tool of governance in military
conﬂict, health, commerce and entertainment (Haggerty and Ericson 2006).
Recent work on surveillance thus provides a solid and fertile ground to exam-
ine the social implications of the proliferating range of new aims, agendas,
objects, agents, technologies, practices and perceptions of surveillance from a
wide range of perspectives.
Despite this increasingly sophisticated body of theoretical and empirical
research, however, very few academics have provided critical accounts of the
complex ways through which speciﬁc models of surveillance are becoming
‘expert exemplars’ for more normalised use. All too frequently, the study of
particular surveillance projects is thus separated from the critical investiga-
tion of the broader processes, mechanisms and relationships, which lie behind
the current proliferation of globally calibrated security procedures, oper-
ations and strategies.
It is from such a standpoint that this chapter engages with the spatial
articulation of surveillance during the 2006 football World Cup, as a key
moment, and as a key location, in the production and circulation of security/
surveillance-related practices and expertise on diﬀerent – local, regional or
global – scales. The analysis builds upon the general understanding of
the World Cup as both the product and the producer of a broader set of
developments in security politics. Based on the study of a series of oﬃcial
documents (from police sources, political authorities and FIFA) and media
articles about the World Cup, I shall advance a number of preliminary
arguments in connection with four main developments at work within current
dynamics and global re-calibrations of surveillance, which together consti-
tute the basic structure of this chapter: the urbanisation, globalisation,
technologicalisation and commercialisation of surveillance.
In each part, I shall ﬁrst discuss how each development explains the
relationships between the security/surveillance operations for the World Cup
and space. I shall then provide a reading of how these developments are
reﬂected in two speciﬁc examples of spatially anchored security measures:
public viewing events and security rings around World Cup stadiums. From
an analytic standpoint, this approach provides an exploratory framework not
only to investigate where, by whom, how and to what purpose security polit-
ics imposed its logic on urban space but also to examine the broader pro-
cesses at work within local, national and international interdependences in
the co-production of security politics.
2
URBANISATION OF SURVEILLANCE
Mega sport events are typically moving from host city to host city (Hiller
2000). Their organisation and securitisation thus mainly constitute urban
phenomena, even if their economic and social outputs are often expected to
lie on a broader, national or international scale. According to Boyle and
Haggerty,
the primary fronts for security programs underwritten by recent devel-
opments are increasingly urban-centred. Security concerns are couched
within, or coloured by, an urban frame of reference to the point that
every security apprehension appears to be somehow urban and every
urban issue is infused with security concerns. Mega-events ﬁgure prom-
inently in the dynamics of this global re-calibration of security.
(Boyle and Haggerty 2005: 4)
For the purpose of this chapter, emphasising the urban-centrism of mega
sport events helps to explain both the general conditions and the speciﬁc
needs as regards spatially anchored security/surveillance operations during
the World Cup. In this perspective, however, the World Cup 2006 diﬀers
from other mega sport events in at least three important ways. First, in con-
trast to the concentration of Olympic athletes in speciﬁc villages near the host
city of the Games, many national teams before and during the World Cup
chose to stay in relatively remote villages, which often led to considerable
security concerns in traditionally rural areas. In the small village of Achern,
for example (in Germany’s southern black forest region), English fans were
allowed to camp near their national team’s high-class residence, within a
clearly designated area for up to 5000 fans (Dpa/Swr 12.4.2006: online).
Rented out by a private provider, the camp was not only monitored by
freshly installed CCTV cameras but also by both private and public security
agents, aiming to secure the rearranged and demarcated (fenced) ex-parking
ﬁeld (Mühlfeit 20.6.2006: online). As we shall see shortly, these security
measures are in many ways similar to security/surveillance operations for
public viewing events in the urban environment. Second, the staging of the
World Cup games aﬀected not only one particular urban site but a network
of 12 German host cities with World Cup stadiums, where most football
fans, thousands of World Cup collaborators and hundreds of media repre-
sentatives were concentrated: Gelsenkirchen, Dortmund, Cologne, Berlin,
Munich, Hanover, Hamburg, Leipzig, Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Kaiserslautern
and Nuremberg. Third, with more than 200 public viewing events in most
large cities and many small villages, security issues became part of the agen-
das of various urbanised municipalities across Germany. Given the funda-
mentally diﬀerent character and behaviour of football fans from supporters
at Olympic Games, for example, and given the mobility of fans within the
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network of German host cities, security issues at the World Cup thus cru-
cially aﬀected large parts of Germany.
From this, however, we must by no means call into question the predomin-
antly urban dimension of the World Cup’s securitisation. On the contrary,
considering security operations both in aﬀected rural areas and in host cities
as locally anchored key sites of the World Cup helps to identify the relation-
ships between security politics and space more generally. In both cases, spa-
tially anchored security operations were driven by the need to monitor and
manage risks in a context of increased diversity and density, which obviously,
but not only, applies to the urban environment, as the locus of increased
density and diversity par excellence. ‘Urban space gathers crowds, products in
the markets, acts and symbols. It concentrates all these, and accumulates
them’ (Lefebvre 1991: 101). As I seek to demonstrate in this chapter, the
spatial logics of security operations during the World Cup, both in cities and
in rural areas, above all dealt with the marking, division, delimitation, i.e.
with the diﬀerentiation, of relatively distinct and small portions of space, in
order to regulate densely packed social activities through spatial operations
and actions.
While this claim will be illustrated by the examples of public viewing events
and security rings around World Cup stadiums, many other examples (from
team hotels to railway stations, etc.) could in principle provide the basis for a
more precise, micro-geographical analysis of physical and symbolic markings
and arrangements of space by fences, patrolling police agents, access control
installations, surveillance devices, etc.
Public viewing events and security rings
around stadiums
The organisation of public viewing events constitutes a particularly meaning-
ful example for pointing out how security politics, following the need to
manage social risks in a context of increased diversity and density, translates
into the urban territory. Conceived as central meeting spots for fans without
match tickets, public viewing sites allowed supporters to watch football
games on massive video screens in the heart of most German city centres.
Clearly separated from their surroundings by fences, planned and often archi-
tecturally conceived like sport arenas (including diﬀerent areas such as spe-
cial children’s sections and sections which were liable to pay costs), public
viewing sites were in many ways treated like stadiums. Securing these publicly
accessible ‘places at risk’ became one of the main focuses for both German
and international police forces and for private security staﬀ, which were hired
by the commercial organisers of the events.
From this perspective, public viewing sites can be understood as the privil-
eged spatial points of security politics within the urban environment, har-
bouring speciﬁc norms, values and constraints, including spot-checks of
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onlookers and speciﬁc legal regulations. According to these regulations,
people with stadium bans or with a blood alcohol level of more than 160mL
were banned from public viewing sites (Gelsenkirchen 2006). In contrast to
real stadiums however, access control to public viewing sites was not based on
generalised identity checks.
Generally speaking, public viewing sites predominantly concentrated fans
on speciﬁc points in the city centre. Thus, they hierarchically invested
(selected, classiﬁed, separated, symbolically marked, materially arranged and
controlled) particular portions of space, whilst other urban areas remained
less considered. As we shall see later in this chapter, these diﬀerentiations of
the city were further strengthened by the uneven deployment of surveillance
technologies and by the reinforced presence of police and private security
agents.
In addition to public viewing events, the so-called ‘outer security ring’
around World Cup stadiums provides a second, powerful example of how
security politics resulted in new diﬀerentiations and hierarchisations of the
urban environment, expressed as diﬀerent types of constraints and stipula-
tions. Reaching as far as 1 kilometre from the stadium (depending on the
city), the outer security ring constituted the ﬁrst clearly fenced barrier to the
stadium for arriving fan groups. Restricted to holders of match tickets,
accredited staﬀ, members of the press and other authorised persons, the
enclosed area was closed to the general public for the duration of the World
Cup. The spatial delimitation of the outer security ring around World Cup
stadiums, however, diﬀers from public viewing events not only in its further
restricted ‘permeability’ but also in its internal organisation. Conceived as the
spatial stadium’s extension, security rings were divided into four strictly sep-
arated sectors, following the need to avoid encounters between diﬀerent fan
groups. These sectors were accessible only by passing through particular
access points, after repeated ticket and luggage checks. Despite these diﬀer-
ences, however, public viewing events and security rings around stadiums are
comparable in both their spatial logics and functions. Both cases bear
material testimony of the production of distinct, spatial ensembles, which are
materially and symbolically separated from their adjoining perimeters in
order to regulate social activities through the separation and marking of
hierarchically invested territories of security.
As the locus, medium and tool of security politics, and as an immediate,
lived and experienced practical reality, both public viewing events and sta-
dium rings can be seen as central points within the urban net- and meshwork
of security politics. Serving to ‘deﬁne both a scene (where something takes
place) and an obscene area to which everything that cannot or may not
happen on the scene is relegated’ (Lefebvre 1991: 36), the securitisation of
public viewing events and stadium rings above all relied on access control.
Aiming to create safe and risk-free places by controlling ﬂows (of people and
objects), which are crossing the border line between inside and outside at
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particular points in space, access control perfectly illustrates the fundamental
spatial logic of security politics, which consists in selecting, classifying, dif-
ferentiating, arranging and controlling speciﬁc portions of space, without
according the same type of attention to the whole urban (or national)
territory.
Access control thus above all aims to guarantee the well functioning of
separated, diﬀerentiated and hierarchically organised parts of the urban
environment, often carried to the point of complete segregation between
indoor (secured) and outdoor (unsecured) space. Legitimised by the rhetoric
of security, access control permits particular functions to be assigned to par-
ticular places. In other words, the regulation of social and spatial practices in
the urban environment, at moments of increased social risks, does need bor-
ders and frontiers to control, organise, enlarge, facilitate, but also to super-
vise, enclose and if necessary repress. ‘The prime function of surveillance in
the contemporary era is border control. We do not care who is out there or
what they are doing. We want to see only those who are entitled to enter’
(Boyne 2000).
GLOBALISATION OF SURVEILLANCE
Surveillance, as the expression of a project, is the product of relationships,
which are mediated by speciﬁc codes, techniques, intentions, domains of
expertise, etc. It is thus of crucial importance to examine the networks of
actors involved in the setting up, development and use of spatially anchored
security strategies for the World Cup. At this point, however, it would be too
tall an order to provide an exhaustive analysis of the whole panoply of
actions and actors engaged in the securitisation of the World Cup. Rather, I
will put particular emphasis on the proliferating range, scale and importance
of multinational security collaborations.
To begin, it is worth providing some general examples of globalised secur-
ity partnerships for the World Cup before examining the territorial expres-
sion of these linkages in relation to public viewing events and security rings
around stadiums. Two years before the World Cup, Germany itself – together
with Australia, France, Israel, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United
States – took part in the Olympic Security Advisory Group, which provided
coordinated security advice to Greece on its security planning (United States
Government Accountability Oﬃce 2005: 6). During the World Cup, police
oﬃcers from 13 countries were reported to join the German federal police, to
build up the largest joint police operation in European history, as the
spokesman for Germany’s interior ministry was repeatedly quoted in the
press (for example Associated Press 6.6.2006: online). Teaming up with
German oﬃcers, international police agents were vested with similar com-
petences as their German counterparts, including the power to arrest and
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expel fans of their own nationality. This collaboration was completed by
intense exchanges of international hooligan databases, by close communica-
tions among secret services from diﬀerent countries and by the integration of
international terrorism experts (Bundesministerium des Innern 2004: 6). As
the spokesman for Germany’s interior ministry pointed out in the press, ‘to
give up that much sovereignty would have been unthinkable a decade ago’
(Sachs 2006; cited in Associated Press 6.6.2006: online).
Furthermore, in order to control and restrict border crossing of ‘undesir-
able’ fans, bilateral agreements with all participating countries as well as with
several neighbouring and transit states were signed before the World Cup.
‘We want to create a threat ﬁlter which is eﬀective beyond our borders: in the
participating countries, transit countries and in the countries of our direct
neighbours. The bilateral agreements are the basis for travel bans on hooli-
gans and potential criminal oﬀenders. They allow an intensive exchange of
information and enable us to deploy security forces of partner states in
Germany’ (Schäuble 30.3.2006: online). Political agreements of such types
are symptomatic of at least three broader developments in security politics:
ﬁrst, they again point out the crucial importance of access and border control
(and thus of mobility management) for security politics, in addition to the
already mentioned range of inner-urban access controls. As I have argued
above, border control relates to space in a most signiﬁcant way, in that it
constitutes and reinforces a spatially anchored system of limits, resulting in
the arrangement, marking and diﬀerentiation of space into hierarchically
organised territories of security. Second, Germany’s bilateral agreements
with participating and neighbouring countries point towards the high rele-
vance of formalised, transnational alliances within security politics. If we
want to uncover the relationships embedded in contemporary developments
of security politics, and if we want to assess how security systems are sub-
sequently planned, built up and used, the importance of government alli-
ances on a global scale cannot be underestimated. Security issues at mega
sport events are thus often described as a catalyst in setting oﬀ much broader
and longer-lasting international security collaborations (Chan 2002). Third,
the temporary and ﬂexible reintroduction of border controls with Schengen
partners strongly underlines the current exempliﬁcation processes of security
politics. In recent years, this measure has indeed become a common ‘exem-
plar’ of dealing with security and terror issues at major (sport) events. For
example, Portugal re-introduced border checks during the European Football
Championships 2004, while Finland did the same during the 2005 World
Athletics Championships in Helsinki.
Fourth, the emphasis on joint international security operations for the
World Cup can be highlighted by Germany’s request for the assistance of two
Nato Airborne Warning and Control System planes (Awacs), in order to
provide airspace surveillance for this ‘Special Major Event’, as the World Cup
was called in military jargon (Bittner and Klenk 11.5.2006: 10). This request
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not only gives another ﬂavour of the scale and importance of the securitisa-
tion of the World Cup on an international scale but also emphasises the
broader trend towards the increasing militarisation of public safety, linked to
the prevention of crowd violence and terrorist attacks (Warren 2004). There
is another point to be made here regarding the aforementioned exempliﬁca-
tion of security politics. Since Nato began to give air surveillance support in
2001, as part of the Alliance’s contribution to the defence against global
terrorism, Awac planes have ﬂown more than 3000 hours for more than 30
events, including the Summer Olympic Games in Athens 2004, the 2005
Winter Games in Turin and the Pope’s visit to Poland a few days before the
World Cup (Nato 6.6.2006: online).
Public viewing events and security rings
around stadiums
More particularly, in order to understand the transposition of current global-
isation processes of security politics onto the level of urban morphology, it is
worth looking back at the examples of public viewing events and security
rings around World Cup stadiums. Public viewing sites indeed constitute a
powerful example of the increasing globalisation of security politics, i.e. its
co-production between numerous public and private, local, national and
international parties. While local (commercial) organisers were held respon-
sible for the securitisation of public viewing events in the ﬁrst place (Polizei
Nordrheinwestfahlen 2006: 3), public viewing sites also constituted the privil-
eged territorial framework for the deployment of the above mentioned
national and international police forces, as various images on internet
weblogs (f.ex. www.ﬂickr.com) of posing fans with English, French or even
Angolan police oﬃcers suggest. Globalisation processes of surveillance can
thus not only be seen in connection with the planning and setting up of
security politics ‘behind the scenes’ but also within the urban environment
itself.
The same applies to security rings around World Cup stadiums, revealing
again to what degree security politics during the World Cup has been co-
produced through globalised, public–private security partnerships: adding to
the high number of state actors (from police agents to ﬁre brigades and
emergency services) more than 15,000 private, nationally and internationally
recruited security agents and stewards were employed by FIFA for an esti-
mated 30 million, mainly for security purposes within the outer security
rings of the stadiums and for ticket controls (Borchers 17.5.2006: online).
Adding to the erection of fences, as new material and symbolic border
lines in the urban environment, the deployment of international security per-
sonnel strongly contributed to the demarcation and control of speciﬁc spatial
ensembles, as the privileged locus, medium and tool of security politics. Both
public viewing events and stadium security rings acquired normative value as
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an immediate practical reality only through their active surveillance and regu-
lation by globalised and privatised security partnerships and by the wide use
of surveillance technologies, as we shall see in the following section. The
degree of diﬀerentiation which was superimposed upon the urban environ-
ment above all followed the mobilisation of myriad diﬀerent actors, harbour-
ing speciﬁc domains of expertise, instruments, etc. Only if we take into
account the various needs and intentions of these parties (both behind the
scenes and on the spot) can we understand how spatially anchored security
measures are helping to impose a certain order on the urban environment.
Both public viewing events and stadium security rings also indicate how
the security measures employed and tested during the World Cup can be
setting new trends for security politics more generally. In the ‘Host City
Charta’ for the organisation of the 2008 European Championship in Austria
and Switzerland, a detailed contract between UEFA and the European
Championship host cities, the staging of public viewing sites and the demar-
cation of stadium security rings is indeed prescribed with great care and
explicit reference to the FIFA World Cup. Swiss and Austrian police delegates
closely followed every step of their German homologues during the World
Cup (Blick 26.5.2006: online). Public viewing events and stadium security
rings can thus accurately be described as pre-deﬁned security models, which
are based on the delimitation, demarcation, material arrangement and sym-
bolical marking of particular portions of space within the urban environment.
TECHNOLOGICALISATION OF SURVEILLANCE
Security issues at mega sport events also involve the increasingly complex
assemblages of disconnected, semi-coordinated and heterogeneous forms
and functions of surveillance (Ericson and Haggerty 2000). Mega sport
events are indeed largely used as test sites of increasingly sophisticated high-
tech security, thus strongly pushing forward the use of new, preventive
arrangements of control and surveillance, which are disproportionately valu-
ing the surveillance and securitisation of particular ‘places at risk’. This
claim is powerfully exempliﬁed by experiences in Athens’ summer Olympics
2004 (Samatas 2006), Turin’s Winter Games 2005 and Germany’s FIFA
World Cup 2006. In Athens, the so-called ‘C4I-system’ included thousands
of computers, surveillance cameras (partially equipped with automated
behaviour-recognition software) and microphones (able to analyse dozens of
languages). This unprecedented science ﬁction security system was modelled
on a range of military technologies including underwater sensors, patriot
missiles, zeppelins and US battleships. During the World Cup, the ‘nerve
centre’ for German-wide security operations was located inside the Interior
Ministry in Berlin. Here, 120 security agents, equipped with monitoring
screens, dozens of computers and sophisticated communication gear, brought
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together satellite views, close-up CCTV images from sport arenas and city
centres and reports from police sources, the military and from intelligence
services (Nickerson 7.6.2006: online). On-the-spot, specialised police agents
employed ‘fast identiﬁcation’ devices for DNA analyses of suspect individuals
(Bild 11.6.2006: online).
Importantly, these examples not only underline the aforementioned global-
isation of security and surveillance issues but also point towards the multipli-
cation of private responsibilities in providing technologically-based solutions
in matters of public safety and counter terrorism policies. The growth of
socio-technical arrangements and operations that are put to work within
security politics is also resulting in new interdependences between diﬀerent
parties concerned. Here I have in mind in particular the technical com-
petences required to manage high-tech security systems, which are likely to
give certain highly specialised, private parties more weight. The multiplica-
tion of the use of socio-technological mediations in the ‘making’ of surveil-
lance is also resulting in new procedures and even leading to new, highly
specialised professions, such as ‘surveillance designers’, for example (Ruegg,
November and Klauser 2004). Furthermore, it is particularly interesting to
note that the use of surveillance technologies is accompanied not only by the
creation of an increasing number of private intermediaries but also by the
development of a specialised language, the use of which becomes accessible
only to specialists. Relationships between the user- and the supply-side of
surveillance technologies are thus going far beyond the level of mere business
relations in that they are bringing together a wide range of subtle, complex
and contingent interests, strategies and reciprocal implications.
Public viewing events and security rings
around stadiums
The growing use of technologically-based security operations at mega sport
events probably ﬁnds its clearest expression in the securitisation of the outer
security ring around World Cup stadiums. Digital communication technolo-
gies in the rebuilt Olympia Stadium in Berlin included nearly 300 kilometres
of cabling, converging in the stadium’s Facilities Management Centre as the
heart of the security system. Here, private security staﬀ and police agents
jointly monitored CCTV images of the stadium, the underground car park
and the routes to the boxes. From this central point of the security system,
most of the monitored locations in Berlin could also be visualised, as well as
transmitted images from mobile surveillance vehicles within the city centre.
Furthermore, a large number of other high-tech security devices were used
by security staﬀ, such as robots to check the stadium’s surroundings for
bombs before matches and high-resolution cameras with face-recognition
software, allowing the recording of biometric facial features of suspected
hooligans, which could be checked in real time against photos stored in a
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central database (Blau 29.5.2006). Importantly, all 3.5 million match tickets
were sold with embedded RFID chips, containing personal information on
the ticket holder (name, address, date of birth, nationality and number of ID
card or passport), which was electronically checked not less than four times
before arrival at the stadium.
Besides these spatially-bound and technically-based access control meas-
ures, it is particularly relevant to focus on CCTV, in order to point out the
spatial logics of surveillance in general and for the World Cup more particu-
larly. We have already seen that the organisation of the World Cup resulted in
the ﬁrst use of biometric face-recognition cameras in Germany. Consider as
well the condition of CCTV monitoring for the staging of oﬃcial public
viewing events in the whole of Germany, leading to the implantation of an
important number of additional surveillance cameras in public places in
German host cities. In Stuttgart, for example, hundreds of CCTV cameras
were installed for the World Cup, provided by the same manufacturer (Indigo-
Vision) and with similar technical features, as for the 2006 Olympic Games in
Turin and in Athens in 2004. Adding to this, public transport companies
in many German cities just before the World Cup invested millions of euros
in CCTV technology, such as in Munich, where an additional 542 surveillance
cameras were installed two years before the World Cup to monitor metro
stations, escalators, etc. (Münchner Verkehrsgesellschaft 4.2.2004: online).
In fact, while much eﬀort has been expended on analysing video surveil-
lance as a tool of social sorting, there is a current lack of research regarding
the spatial logics and characteristics of CCTV. Before targeting speciﬁc social
groups or individuals, the installation points of the cameras, their technical
features (zoom, angle of vision, etc.), their direction while unattended and the
active manipulations of their position by camera operators are ﬁrst and
foremost related to speciﬁc portions of space. Individuals or social groups are
monitored once they enter the cameras’ gaze. Social behaviour is of interest
only within the cameras’ premises. As a limited window to the city, video
surveillance must thus above all be considered as ‘surveillance of space’.
First, the camera’s position can be quite vertical in order to concentrate on
one particular point in space, often corresponding to access gates or entrance
doors. Second, the monitoring of certain ‘spatial points’ may be enlarged to
‘spatial lines’. In this case, the cameras’ gaze not only allows coverage of one
particular point of interest but the monitoring of whole building walls, plat-
forms in metro stations, etc. Consequently, the camera’s position will be more
horizontal, following the need to ‘stretch’ its ﬁeld of vision. Third, in the case
of movable, swivelling and zooming cameras, CCTV might enable the trans-
mission and recording of visual information, relating to larger ‘spatial sur-
faces’. Once again, however, surveillance operations will be restricted to
speciﬁc parts of space. Corresponding to diﬀerent spatial scales of surveil-
lance, all three types of CCTV powerfully illustrate the logics of security
politics to select and to disproportionably monitor distinct, hierarchically
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organised and relatively small portions of space, with the result of new spatial
disparities between more or less monitored areas within city centres.
COMMERCIALISATION OF SURVEILLANCE
A growing body of theoretical and empirical research focuses on the value
of mega sport events as ‘entrepreneurialist’ strategies of public policy
(Harvey 1989; Hubbard and Hall 1998), entitled to promote cities’ and
nations’ tourist image (Hannigan 1998; Fainstein and Judd 1999), to facilitate
urban regeneration, to attract ﬁnancial investments and, consequently, to
produce economic development (Euchner 1999; Degen 2004). As we see
in oﬃcial statements from the German government, the same logic also
applied to the World Cup, which was presented by the Interior Ministry as a
unique opportunity for a ‘business location and image campaign’ to promote
Germany as both a ‘hospitable, cosmopolitan and modern country’ and a
‘strong and innovative place’ (Schäuble 30.3.2006: online).
Yet this highly revealing literature on mega sport events in terms of city
marketing and ‘place selling’ (Philo and Kearns 1993; Horne and Manzenre-
iter 2006) tends to ignore completely the business-relevant role of security
politics. Consider, by way of example, Konrad Freiburg, head of the German
police union, who stated that ‘there would be terrible pictures seen all over the
world – in which 200 mad neo-Nazis are being protected by a ring of 1000
policemen from a counter-demonstration. This would be shameful. It’s not
the image of Germany we want to present’ (Freiburg 2006; cited in Furlong
5.6.2006: online). In this light, threats of terrorism and escalating hooligan or
neo-Nazi violence were seen not only to endanger the population but also to
threaten the carefully constructed marketing image of an ‘enjoyable, colour-
ful and secure World Cup’ (Schäuble 30.3.2006: online).
However, the World Cup’s economic appeal cannot be reduced to its
importance as a business location and image campaign for Germany and its
host cities. On the contrary, the World Cup above all constituted the com-
mercial product of a powerful, proﬁt-oriented global player: the Fédération
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). Even if the World Cup was
ﬁnancially supported by the German government, the ‘Länder’ and the host
cities, and even if the event was hosted by the German Football Association
(DFB), it was oﬃcially organised by FIFA. ‘This is not Germany’s World
Cup, but FIFA’s World Cup’ – FIFA president Joseph Blatter was famously
quoted in the press (Hanimann, 16.6.2006: online). This statement is of
major importance for the last part of this analysis, as it also raises signiﬁcant
issues regarding the relationships between the tremendous security eﬀorts
during the event and FIFA’s business interests in the World Cup, wherein I
will concentrate on FIFA’s subtly forwarded attempts to guarantee the
exclusive branding of city space by its oﬃcial sponsors. In this, public viewing
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events and stadium security rings provide a particularly meaningful illustra-
tion of the complex relationships between security politics, economic policy
and private business interests, or – in other words – of the relationships
between processes of securitisation and branding of space.
Public viewing events
During the World Cup, the spatial delimitation and diﬀerentiation of public
viewing sites corresponded not only to functional diﬀerences and to diﬀerent
security standards but also to diﬀerent degrees of commercialisation between
the inside and the outside. On the one hand, fences around public viewing
events separated and marked speciﬁc ‘places at risk’, which became the object
of increased control, based on security technologies and realised through
globalised, public–private security partnerships. On the other hand, the same
fences also marked the spatial limits of FIFA’s sphere of inﬂuence within the
city, given the fact that FIFA fully controlled the organisation and marketing
of public viewing events. Indeed, these fan festivals helped to push forward
FIFA’s power to produce its own, commercially useful urban environment in
at least three ways.
First, public viewing events principally had to be registered and licensed
by the Swiss company ‘Infront Sports’, FIFA’s television partner and the
holder of all public viewing rights in Germany (Martens et al 9.3.2006:
online). Furthermore, depending on the classiﬁcations of the event as com-
mercial or non-commercial, public viewing licences were liable to pay costs.
Second, FIFA fully controlled the symbolical marking of fan festivals
through the prescription of brands and advertisement boards to be dis-
played. In this, prominence was given to the logos and products of FIFA
sponsors (Wilson 6.6.2006: online). Only in non-host cities were other spon-
sors admitted, as long as they would not be competitors to oﬃcial FIFA
partners. In this way, FIFA succeeded in creating a ‘clean’, commercially
useful environment for its oﬃcial partners’ products and advertisement
banners. Consequently, many of the most prominent urban squares in
German city centres were invested by FIFA interests for the duration of the
World Cup. The public viewing site in Cologne, for example, on the famous
Roncalliplatz, oﬀered splendid views not only on the Cathedral but also on
the prominently positioned Hyundai exposition model beside a large screen.
Third, FIFA also managed the spatial dimensions of public viewing events,
their separation from the surrounding urban environment and their internal
subdivisions and arrangements. For instance, although public viewing events
strictly concerned public space, FIFA had to give its approval for any exten-
sion of the events’ size, to comply, for example, with the wish of many cities
after the ﬁrst round of the World Cup (Stadionwelt and dpa 16.6.2006:
online).
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Security rings around stadiums
Security rings around stadiums provide a second example to consider the
spatial concurrences between security and business interests. Before the
World Cup, the whole outer security ring had to be handed over to FIFA as
‘neutralised space’, with all signs of advertising and sponsorship removed.
The early, legally binding agreement, determined in point 8.1 of FIFA’s spe-
ciﬁcations for the organisation of the World Cup in the so-called ‘FIFA
Pﬂichtenheft’, had to be signed by the German government and by each host
city before it was even known whether Germany could organise the event
(Pfeil 3.11.2005: online). In this agreement we can deduce not only the weight
of sponsors’ needs within the organisation of the World Cup but also the
deep connection between security issues and appeals of mass marketing.
Spaces near the stadiums had to be separated from their surroundings not
only to provide risk-free games but also to provide the privileged stage for
branding and advertisement strategies and thus to become commercially
invested (symbolically marked and materially arranged) by FIFA sponsors.
At this point, the question might arise as to whether there is any way of
dating what may be called the origin or driving force behind the spatial con-
currence between security and business interests. A deﬁnitive answer to this
question would obviously require more detailed and comparative empirical
investigations into the complex processes, mechanisms and relationships in
the setting up and staging of mega sport events. However, if indeed there is a
need at all to identify a ‘ﬁrst step’ and to maintain its distinction from the
‘following steps’, its importance must be quite relative. Related to the Actor
Network Theory as developed by Bruno Latour and Michel Callon (Latour
1992), there is good reason to assess the ‘making of stadium security rings and
public viewing events’ – or the ‘making of Mega Sport Events’ more generally
– as the result of complex, subtle and highly interwoven interactions and
interdependences of myriad diﬀerent actors, strategies and interests. Various
questions and interests are in play in the set-up of surveillance-based security
politics, just as many diﬀerent aspects help to model the ability of particular
measures or constructions to respond to the existing demands.
At this stage, it is of most importance to underline the factual correspond-
ences between diﬀerent functions of space, which allowed FIFA to impose its
own spatial rationality and commercial branding within the re-territorialised
stadiums’ surroundings. Both our examples of spatially bound security oper-
ations during the World Cup – public viewing events and security rings
around stadiums – thus point towards the fact that the partitioning of the
urban environment into speciﬁc areas of control also stood for speciﬁc rela-
tionships to the city, mediated through FIFA’s intentions to create a clean
environment for its oﬃcial partners’ merchandise.
Following on from this, it is particularly interesting to note that the nega-
tive implications of stadium security rings for concerned residents and local
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business companies have been widely annihilated, discursively, by the sup-
posed usefulness of stadium security rings (as their very name suggests) for
security purposes, thus fading out potential critiques of FIFA’s economic
beneﬁts. For example, in order not to compete with FIFA sponsors’ interests,
local car garages had to remove their advertisement marks (because of the
exclusivity of Hyundai as oﬃcial FIFA sponsor) and restaurants had to hide
their outside beer signs (advertisement reserved to Budweiser). Furthermore,
to guarantee the FIFA sponsors’ exclusivity, 7 of 12 stadiums were renamed
‘FIFA World Cup stadiums’ because their original denomination contained
the name of a commercial company. In Munich and Hamburg, the huge
sponsors’ names outside the stadiums even had to be removed by a crane
(Wilson 6.6.2006: online). FIFA did not only control the materiality of the
stadiums’ surroundings and names but also fans within the arenas. Before the
game between the Netherlands and Ivory Coast, for example, FIFA collabor-
ators found Dutch fans guilty of ambush marketing because of the logo of a
Dutch beer company – which was not one of the oﬃcial FIFA sponsors – on
their orange dungarees. Consequently, hundreds of fans had to take oﬀ their
trousers before entering the ‘security ring’ around the stadium.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter was driven by two broad objectives. On the one hand, it was
concerned to critically examine the FIFA World Cup 2006 in Germany as
both the product and the producer of a general cluster of developments in
security politics: the urbanisation, globalisation, technologicalisation and
commercialisation of security/surveillance issues. Yet these developments do
not enter into antagonism with each other. On the contrary, each develop-
ment embodies and nourishes the others. For example, the predominantly
urban-centred proliferation of high-tech surveillance technologies also high-
lights current trends in security politics which is becoming increasingly global
in scope (addressing globalised social risks and bringing together globalised
security partnerships) and commercial in nature.
On the other hand, and through the lens of these four developments, the
chapter has analysed the relationships between security politics and space
and the production of hierarchically organised ‘territories of security’ within
Germany’s city network during the World Cup more particularly. These
investigations not only repeatedly underlined the logics of security politics to
select and classify speciﬁc portions of space, to separate these places from
their surroundings and to symbolically mark, materially arrange and control
these portions of space, but also highlighted FIFA’s attempts to reconﬁgure
the urban environment into relatively small, disproportionally commercial-
ised spatial entities.
In order to assess the issues that are linked with this enquiry, we have to
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remember how deeply space is related with society. On the one hand, space is
produced by society and its inherent relationships of power. In this regard,
the last part of the chapter pointed towards FIFA’s power to ‘hegemonically’
produce its own, commercially useful urban environment during the World
Cup. On the other hand, space produces society. According to Lefebvre, a
decisive part is played by space in the continuous reproduction of society.
‘Space commands bodies, prescribing or proscribing gestures, routes and dis-
tances to be covered. It is produced with this purpose in mind; this is its
raison d’être [. . .] Space lays down the law because it implies a certain order –
and hence also a certain disorder (just as what may be seen deﬁnes what is
obscene)’ (Lefebvre 1991: 143). We must, in this light, understand the ﬁnal
aim of the interwoven processes of selection, classiﬁcation, separation, sym-
bolical marking, material arrangement and control of spatial entities as the
regulation and control of social activities. Pointing towards the spatial logics
of security politics thus also highlights the linkages between security politics,
space and social relationships of power more generally.
Exemplifications of security politics
The emerging picture of this twofold analysis suggests a series of further
investigations into the roles and wider social implications of mega sport
events as an important research programme within the interdisciplinary ﬁeld
of Surveillance Studies (Lyon 2007).
First, there is a crucial need to further investigate the increasing import-
ance of private actors and commercial goals within current developments of
security-driven, spatial reorganisations of the urban environment. While the
linkages between the increasing commercialisation of urban space and the
proliferation of spatially anchored security measures such as CCTV, for
example, have been subjected to repeated analytical scrutiny (Reeve 1998;
Coleman and Sim, 2000; Töpfer, Hempel and Cameron 2003), very few aca-
demics have provided critical accounts of how these developments are pushed
forward by globally operating business companies (the FIFA and its oﬃcial
World Cup sponsors, for example). In this, it seems particularly worthwhile to
further investigate the pressures to diﬀerentiate city space into clearly demar-
cated ‘territories of security and commerce’, arising from sponsors’ interests,
private insurance companies, but also from locally anchored shops, hotels,
etc. Or, to put it as a question: what type of commercially motivated interests,
practices and relationships lies behind the security operations and strategies
which assume to protect the population from dangers?
Second, my study of the securitisation of the World Cup points towards a
series of important ‘issues of scale’, which might guide future empirical
investigations of the interactions and interdependences between global,
regional and local security partnerships. What can mega events tell us about
the interactions between security issues on diﬀerent – local, regional and
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global – scales? How do global security partnerships relate to and intervene in
particular local circumstances?
Third, there is a strong and pressing need for further empirical investigations
into the contribution of mega sport events – as test sites for the use of complex
high-tech surveillance systems – for the development of increasingly standard-
ised ways of dealing with security issues more generally. In both scholarly
research and public debate about current developments in security politics,
there is in fact almost a complete silence on the question of how speciﬁc secur-
ity measures are becoming expert ‘exemplars’ for more normalised use not
only in similar circumstances (‘horizontal exempliﬁcation’) but also in other,
more trivial moments, situations and places of everyday social life (‘vertical
exempliﬁcation’). In the ﬁrst case, mega sport events must be further exploited
in their importance as a privileged locus, where globally operating standard
actors – moving from country to country, from city to city and from event
to event – are implanting increasingly standardised security solutions to cre-
ate standardised territories of security. The underlying assumption could be
that the potential applications of these standard security solutions are not
deﬁned in relation to any locally anchored social, cultural or legal speciﬁcities
but by the predeﬁned equation: speciﬁc type of event = speciﬁc range of
possible applications of security models. In this regard, critical attention
must above all be paid to the increasingly important part which is played by
private security companies, ‘wandering the planet in search of consultancy
fees and places to save, “parachuting in” to localities with plans and designs
and then moving on to the next place – almost as if they ﬂoat free without any
connection to any kind of territory’ (Holden and Iveson 2003: 66).
In the second case, referring to the ‘vertical exempliﬁcation of security
politics’, this standardisation process does not only apply to structurally simi-
lar places, moments and events. Rather, previously tested security solutions
(such as RFID chips or biometric face-recognition software for access con-
trol to sport stadiums, for example) also tend to be generalised in more ordin-
ary places, situations and moments of everyday life (such as in supermarkets,
etc.). From this perspective, it will be of major importance to further evaluate
the new international pressures arising from internationally pre-established
security models, which are increasingly inﬂuencing local decisions. What does
this development – which could also be described as an increasing ‘normalisa-
tion of the exceptional’ (Agamben 2005; Flyghed 2002) – mean in terms of
the scope for critical democratic debate about the appropriateness and pro-
portionality of speciﬁc surveillance measures?
Regarding the FIFA World Cup 2006 in Germany more particularly, a
major issue will be whether the temporarily engaged security measures will
continue to impose themselves within the urban environment. What future
will be reserved for those fences, checkpoints and technological infra-
structures whose installation was legitimised by the exceptional circum-
stances of the World Cup? On a political level, and after the emotions evoked
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by the event itself, these questions should be resolved calmly, by considering
again the wide range of social costs and beneﬁts related to the above shown
trends in security politics.
References
Agamben, G. (2005) State of Exception, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Associated Press (6.6.2006) ‘World Cup Security Force Assembles in Germany’, Fox
News. Available at: http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/
0,3566,198410,00.html (accessed 15.10.07).
Bild (11.6.2006) ‘Gen-Tests für deutsche Hooligans’, Bild. Available at: http://
www.bild.t-online.de/BTO/news/aktuell/2006/06/11/gen-testhooligans/gentest
(accessed 15.9.06).
Bittner, J. and Klenk, F. (11.5.2006) ‘Die Mannschaft für die schlimmsten Fälle’, Die
Zeit, 11 May, 20: 10–11.
Blau, J. (29.5.2006) ‘World Cup – security scores big at tournament’, Computerworld.
Available at: http://www.computerworld.com.au/index.php/id;1926576695;rel-
comp;1 (accessed 15.10.07).
Blick (26.5.2006) ‘WM als EM-Testlauf’, Blick. Available at: http:www.blick.ch/sport/
wm06/artikel37580?layout=popup (accessed 15.9.06).
Borchers, D. (17.5.2006) ‘Fussball-WM: Zwickmühle Sicherheit’, heise. Available at:
http://www.heise.de/newsticker/meldung/print/73232 (accessed 15.10.07).
Boyle, P. and Haggerty, K.D. (2005) ‘Spectacular Security: Mega-Events and the
Security Complex’, paper presented at the Our North America: From Turtle Island
to the Security and Prosperity Partnership Speaker Series, hosted by the Department
of Political Science, University of Alberta, Edmonton.
Boyne, R. (2000) ‘Post-Panopticism’, Economy and Society, 29(2): 285–307.
Bundesministerium des Innern (2004) Die Welt zu Gast bei Freunden, Dritter Forsc-
hungsbericht des Stabes WM 2006 zur Vorbereitung auf die FIFA-Fussball-
Weltmeisterschaft 2006, Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern.
Chan, G. (2002) ‘From the “Olympic Formula” to the Beijing Games: towards greater
integration across the Taiwan Strait?’, Cambridge Review of International Aﬀairs,
15(1): 141–148.
Coleman, R. and Sim, J. (2000) ‘You’ll never walk alone: CCTV surveillance, order
and neo-liberal rule in Liverpool city centre’, British Journal of Sociology, 51(4):
623–639.
Degen, M. (2004) ‘Barcelona’s Games: The Olympics, urban design, and global tour-
ism’, in M. Sheller and J. Urry (eds) Tourism Mobilities: Places to Play, Places in
Play, London: Routledge: 131–142.
Dpa/Swr (12.4.2006) ‘Die Briten kommen doch nach Baden’, Sport ARD. Available
at: http://sport.ard.de/wm2006/wm/vorort/swr/news04/england_camp.jhtml
(accessed 15.10.07).
Ericson, R. and Haggerty, K. (2000) ‘The surveillant assemblage’, British Journal of
Sociology, 51(4): 605–621.
Euchner, C.C. (1999) ‘Tourism and sports: the serious competition for play’, in D.R. Judd
and S.S. Fainstein (eds) The Tourist City, London: Yale University Press, 215–232.
Fainstein, S.S. and Judd, D.R. (1999) ‘Global forces, local strategies, and urban
18
tourism’, in D.R. Judd and S.S. Fainstein (eds) The Tourist City, London: Yale
University Press, 1–20.
Flyghed, J. (2002) ‘Normalising the exceptional: the case of political violence’,
Policing and Society, 13(1): 23–41.
Furlong, R. (5.6.2006) ‘Hosts tackle security risks head-on’, BBC News. Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/5008296.stm (accessed 15.10.07).
Gelsenkirchen Glückaufkampfbahn (2006) Fanfest-Ordnung. Available at: http://
www.glueckaufkampfbahn2006.de/down/Fanfest-Ordnung.pdf (accessed
15.10.07).
Haggerty, K. and Ericson, R. (eds) (2006) The New Politics of Surveillance and
Visibility, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Hanimann, D. (16.6.2006) ‘Deutsche lassen Blatter links liegen’, Blick. Available at:
http://www.blick.ch/wm06&artikel39054?layout=popup (accessed 15.9.06).
Hannigan, J. (1998) Fantasy City, London: Routledge.
Harvey, D. (1989) ‘From managerialism to entrepreneurialism: the transformation in
urban governance in late capitalism’, Geograﬁska Annaler, 71B: 3–17.
Hiller, H. (2000) ‘Toward an urban sociology of mega-events’, Research in Urban
Sociology, 5: 191–205.
Holden, A. and Iveson, K. (2003) ‘Designs on the urban: New Labour’s urban renais-
sance and the spaces of citizenship’, City, 7(1): 57–72.
Horne, J. and Manzenreiter, W. (eds) (2006) Sports Mega-Events: Social Scientiﬁc
Analyses of a Global Phenomenon, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Hubbard, P. and Hall, P. (1998) ‘The entrepreneurial city and the “new urban polit-
ics” ’, in P. Hall and P. Hubbard (eds) The Entrepreneurial City, Chichester: John
Wiley & Sons, 1–26.
Latour, B. (1992) Aramis ou l’amour des techniques, Paris: La Découverte.
Lefebvre, H. (1991) The Production of Space, Oxford: Blackwell.
Lyon, D. (2007) Surveillance Studies. An Overview, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Lyon, D. (ed.) (2003) Surveillance as Social Sorting, London: Routledge.
Lyon, D. (2002) ‘Surveillance Studies: understanding visibility, mobility and the
phonetic ﬁx’, Surveillance & Society, 1(1): 1–7.
Martens, R., Gertz, H. and Greulich, M. (9.3.2006) ‘Widerstand der Fan-Guerilleros’,
Spiegel online. Available at: http://www.spiegel.de/sport/fussball/0,1518,druck-
404181,00.html (accessed 15.10.07).
Marx, G.T. (1988) Undercover: Police Surveillance in America, Berkeley/Los Angeles:
University of California Press.
Mühlfeit, P. (20.6.2006) ‘Fancamp zur “Chefsache” erklärt’, Sport ARD. Available at:
http://sport.ard.de/wm2006/wm/vorort/swr/news06/20/englandcamp.jhtml
(accessed 15.10.07).
Münchner Verkehrsgesellschaft (4.2.2004) Die neue U-Bahnbetriebszentrale der MVG:
High-Tech-Steuerung für 300 Mio. Kunden, Press report. Available at: http://
www.mvg-mobil.de/presse/presse_2004/04.02.2004b.htm (accessed 15.10.07).
Nato (6.6.2006) ‘NATO support for FIFA World cup in Germany’. Available at: http:/
/www.nato.int/shape/news/2006/06/060606a.htm (accessed 15.10.07).
Nickerson, C. (7.6.2006) ‘Security measures kick into high gear’, The Boston
Globe. Available at: http://www.boston.com/sports/articles/2006/06/07/
security_measures_kick_into_high_gear?mode=PF (accessed 15.10.07).
19
Pfeil, M. (3.11.2005) ‘Platz da für die Fifa!’, Die Zeit, 45. Available at: http://
www.zeit.de/2005/45/FIFA-Republik (accessed 15.10.07).
Philo, C. and Kearns, G. (1993) ‘Culture, history, capital: a critical introduction to the
selling of places’, in G. Kearns and C. Philo (eds) Selling Places. The City as
Cultural Capital, Past and Present, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1–32.
Polizei Nordrheinwestfahlen (2006) Sicherheit bei der WM – grundsätzliche Zust-
ändigkeiten. Available at: http://www1.polizei-nrw.de (accessed 15.9.06).
Reeve, A. (1998) ‘The panopticisation of shopping: CCTV and leisure consumption’,
in C. Norris, J. Morran and G. Armstrong (eds), Surveillance, CCTV and Social
Control, Aldershot: Ashgate, 69–88.
Ruegg, J., November, V. and Klauser, F. (2004) ‘CCTV, risk management and regula-
tion mechanisms in publicly-used places: a discussion based on Swiss examples’,
Surveillance and Society, 2(2/3): 415–429.
Samatas, M. (2006) ‘Security and surveillance in the Athens 2004 Olympics: some
lessons from a troubled story’, paper presented at the International Sociological
Association World Congress, ad hoc session on Security, Surveillance and Social
Sorting, July.
Schäuble, W. (30.03.2006) ‘We are creating the basis of an enjoyable, colourful and
secure World Cup’, presented at Conclusive Security Conference on the 2006 FIFA
World Cup in Berlin, 30 March. Available at: http://www.bmi.bund.de/cln_012/
nn_772756/internet/Content/Nachrichten/Reden/2006/03/BM__WM__Sicherheit-
stagung__en.html (accessed 15.10.07).
Stadionwelt and dpa (16.6.2006) ‘FIFA: Längere Fanmeilen erlaubt – Pläne in mehr-
eren Städten’, Stadionwelt. Available at: http://www.stadionwelt.de/wmspecial/
index.php?template=news_detail&news_id=263&stadion=Allgemein (accessed
15.10.07).
Töpfer, E., Hempel, L. and Cameron, H. (2003) Watching the Bear. Networks and
islands of visual surveillance in Berlin, Working Paper no 8, Urbaneye RTD-Project,
5th Framework Programme of the European Commission, Technical University
Berlin: Centre for Technology and Society.
United States Government Accountability Oﬃce (2005) Olympic Security, U.S. Sup-
port to Athens Games Provides Lessons for Future Olympics, Report to Congres-
sional Requesters, no GAO-05’547. Available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d05547.pdf (accessed 15.10.07).
Warren, R. (2004) ‘City streets – the war zones of globalisation: democracy and
military operations on urban terrain in the early twenty-ﬁrst century’, in S. Gra-
ham (ed.) 2004, Cities, War and Terrorism, Oxford: Blackwell, 214–230.
Wilson, B. (6.6.2006) ‘Stadiums renamed for FIFA sponsors’, BBC news. Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4773843.stm (accessed 15.10.07).
20
